The Kurdish question: the process and the grave mistakes by the governments by Eralp, Yalim
 Istanbul Kultur University 
Atakoy Campus,Bakirkoy, 34156 Istanbul-TURKEY 
T: +90 212 498 44 76 | F: +90 212 498 44 05 
www.gpotcenter.org 
The Kurdish Question:  
The process and the grave mistakes by the Governments  
 
Yalım Eralp 
October  2009 
Abstract: For many years successive governments in Turkey have ignored an even denied 
the existence of Kurds in Turkey. What would have been possible in the past by recognizing 
cultural rights has now been a problem whereby an operation seems to be needed. Two 
common and important mistakes of governments: one is to say Kurds are primary citizens 
of this country as if there are secondary citizens! The second is “end the terror and we will 
recognize some rights”. Basic rights cannot be negotiated. This second mistake has led 
Öcalan to announce his own road map paralel to the Governments. Negotiating with 
hostile entities is very difficult and needs public consensus. Turkey, unlike Britain and 
Spain does not have public consensus. The best way was and is to follow EU’s 
democratisation road map. 
    We need to admit that “the Kurdish    
problem” is the outcome of long-running 
consecutive mistakes on the part of our 
governments and institutions. For a long   
time the state claimed there were no Kurds 
in Turkey and refused to acknowledge the 
Kurdish identity. The mere utterance of the 
word was forbidden. 
 
    Yet, this led to comical situtions. While 
those in Northern Iraq were called “Kurds”, 
once the border was crossed we assumed the 
Kurds just vanished. It will be useful to 
briefly examine this process of denial and 
expose the picture it created. 
 
    To begin with, the Lausanne Treaty had a 
clause that could have prevented the 
Kurdish problem from being a problem. 
Between articles 37-44, which deal with 
minority rights, there is a significant 
paragraph that says “every Turkish 
citizen.” 
 
    It will be useful to remember that article 
in its entirety. Article 39/4, either forgotten 
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or effaced, says: “No restrictions shall be 
imposed on the free use by any Turkish 
national of any language in private 
intercourse, in commerce, religion, in the 
press, or in publications of any kind or at 
public meetings.” Had this article been 
implemented, there would not have been 
any restrictions on ethnic identity through 
language, and perhaps the problem we are 
facing today would not be so grave. Let us 
look at main aspects of the picture. 
 
    The Kurdish problem was initially 
discussed because of the uprisings in 
Turkey. Some might remember the 
arguments between the “hawkish” İnönü, 
who gave weight to a military operation in 
the matter, and “moderate” Fethi Okyar, 
who argued the problem did not have a 
military aspect only. Different approaches 
existed back then as well. 
 
    During the 1930s Kurdish citizens were 
banned from naming their children as they 
pleased. Names of villages and counties 
were gradually changed and Turkified by 
the 1970s. People could no longer openly 
talk of being Kurdish. Even Hikmet Çetin, 
who was Foreign Minister in 1991, did not 
like the mentioning of his Kurdish heritage. 
In the process of nation-making, certain 
initial restrictions could have been 
understood, but the situation turned to the 
extreme and became a serious case of 
identity denial in time. This ban on the 
language reached its climax when in the 
aftermath of the 1980 coup “speaking 
Kurdish even at home” was banned. The 
late Turgut Ozal lifted this ban in 1991 after 
much effort. 
 
    In 1965, when the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs heard from diplomatic circles that 
“the Southeast was boiling,” a delegation of 
3 people were secretly dispatched to the 
region. In the report this delegation 
prepared upon their return, it was said that 
an uprising was likely within the next 20 
years. The government of course 
disregarded the report. In reality everybody 
was well aware of the problem but chose to 
ignore it. During the 1980s some high-up 
state officials objected to investing in the 
Southeast, worrying that they would “wake 
up the people.” 
 
    Then the PKK terror started in 1984. As 
the person who typed up the 1965 report     
(it could not be done by secretaries since the 
text included he word Kurd), this did not 
surprise me. In 1988, Ambassadors abroad 
were still asked to explain to the authorities 
of their respective countries that the word 
Kurd came from “kart kurt” (t.n.: It was the 
state’s official stance that the population in 
the Southeast were “Mountain Turks” and 
the word Kurd came from sound “kart kurt” 
made by walking on snow.) Demirel 
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recognized the Kurdish identity in 1991 
when he became Prime Minister, but for 
some reason never used that word again 
after that. 
 
    In 1993, when I was an advisor to PM   
Çiller, I told her “This question cannot be 
the question of any single party; it belongs 
to the Parliament. You should form a 
commission in the Parliament that will 
include bureaucrats working in the region, 
selected individuals from the region and 
those informed about the situation, which 
will then issue a report on the subject to be 
discussed at the Parliaments General 
Assembly”. The Prime Minister took the 
idea to the Speaker of Parliament Cindoruk, 
who rejected it on the grounds of it being 
unconstitutional. It is difficult to understand 
Cindoruk’s stance… 
 
    When I was received by President Demirel 
for a briefing before an upcoming OSCE 
summit in Istanbul in July of 1999, I told him 
that a state-run Kurdish TV channel would 
be a wrong step, that Turkey’s international 
obligation was to lift the ban on cultural 
identities, that the state need not engage in 
these sorts of activities and it would be more 
suitable to allow private local channels to 
broadcast in Kurdish. The President wanted 
me to recount the issue to the Chief of Staff, 
which I did. When the Chief of Staff told me 
the state was in the process of establishing a 
TV channel in Northern Iraq, I pointed out 
that this would be an unnecessarily 
complicating tactic. It was still not 
comprehended that the state needed to lift 
the obstructions before cultural identity. 
 
    Yet, during the same time newspapers 
and magazines started to get published in 
Turkey in Kurdish. Turgut Ozal has a big 
part in this. The government, too, wanted 
this to be publicized abroad in response to 
criticism regarding the bans. Right when this 
was about to be reported to OSCE, the late 
Bülent Ecevit, then Prime Minister, declared 
there was “no such language as Kurdish.” If 
there was no language, how could the 
newspapers be explained! Contradictions 
continued. 
 
    The picture is as described above. This 
issue, which could have been solved 
through a serious recognition of basic rights, 
when -so to speak- could have been treated 
with aspirin and antibiotics, the “patient” 
has been laid on the operating table. 
 
    During the 1990s when the word 
“Kurdish” began to be used more freely, 
almost all PMs and Ministers fell into two 
grave mistakes. The first one is the “Kurds 
are the primary components (of the nation)” 
argument. What does this mean? Are there 
secondary components in Turkey, and who 
are they? They failed to see the contradiction 
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in claiming equal citizenship was the 
unifying bond between the country’s 
citizens and then separating them into 
primary and secondary components. Some 
Kurdish leaders, upon hearing this branding 
of “primary component” asked to go back to 
the 1921 Constitution that rested on a certain 
amount autonomy. They also demanded 
that Kurds and Turks are mentioned 
together and that Kurdish becomes an 
official language of the state. These days 
prominent Kurdish leaders call this 
“consitutional guarantees.” The “primary 
component” expression put forth carelessly 
to show Kurds are not a minority is now 
interpreted in different ways. 
 
    The second common mistake of PMs has 
been the approach that can be summarized 
as “we will give rights only after terror is 
ceased.” This approach is perhaps even 
graver than the first mistake. The question, 
semantic at first sight but essential to the 
conflict in reality, needs explaining. The 
current government has found it difficult to 
name the latest (Kurdish) “initiative.” It was 
first called the Kurdish initiative, then a 
“democratic initiative, and then the National 
Unity project. The approach taken up by this 
government is the process of “granting 
rights while terror is abolished.” In the 
words of Deputy PM Bülent Arınç, “we 
must drink the bitter medicine.” Such 
statements encourage Öcalan. 
    Cultural identity rights, which are part of 
fundamental rights cannot be made into a 
point for negotiations. Cases such as 
everybody learning their native language, 
naming their children however they please, 
villages and towns being granted their 
original names, offering elective Kurdish 
lessons in high schools and establishing 
Kurdish Language chairs in universities do 
not require an amendment in the 
Constitution. If one says “I will grant these 
rights along a process, during which terror 
needs to stop”, then one risks appearing to 
be negotiating with İmralı (Ocalan). Even if 
terror continues, fundamental rights should 
be granted unconditionally. In fact, 
whatever action is being planned is already 
on the roadmap given to Turkey within the 
framework of the Copenhagen criteria after 
Turkey officially became an EU candidate in 
1999, including recognition of ethnic and 
cultural identities and the application of 
appropriate measures. Couldn’t these be   
done within the democratization condition 
put forth by the EU? 
 
    On the international plane, negotiating 
with hostile governments or entities is the 
most difficult task. This can either be direct 
or indirect, and inevitably requires 
compromise. The Republic of Turkey is 
inexperienced in this field. Today 
negotiations that are going on in 
Afghanistan with the Taliban are of this sort. 
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England has been through this process by 
negotiating with the IRA via Sein Fein, the 
political arm of the terrorist organization 
IRA. The English are quite experienced in 
the field, thanks in no small part to their 
colonial past and experience. What Spain 
did with ETA, on the other hand, comes 
from a different history. In the aftermath of 
the fascist Franco regime, Spain, which was 
thirsty for freedom and compromise, had 
the perspective of EU membership ahead of 
it, and the public wanted compromise as 
well. 
 
    A similar process requires concurrence in 
public. It appears from recent developments 
that the Turkish public is not ready for this. 
A number of visits by the Minister of 
Interior to certain intellectuals was not 
sufficient. Indeed, these meetings led to 
suspicions as to what the ultimate objective 
is, since the impression emerged that the 
objectives were different than those in the 
EU roadmap. When in addition to these 
statements were made from İmralı in 
conjuction with the Minister’s statements, 
suspicions arose that the government was 
talking to Ocalan through DTP. Ocalan’s 
agenda, on the other hand, was different 
than the government’s; he was aiming for 
amnesty and becoming active in politics. In 
short, two incompatible projects emerged 
and led to scenes in Habur that angered 
even the government. In reality this was 
inevitable; those who came into Turkey from 
Northern Iraq were following Ocalan’s 
roadmap. The rhetoric of “putting an end to 
mothers’ tears” and the inadmissability of 
the current situation encouraged Ocalan, 
and he announced having drawn a roadmap 
by himself. 
 
    Yet it is also wrong for the Prime Minister 
to angrily state that they would “cross 
everything and go back if those coming 
down from the mountains continue to be 
welcomed with ecstacy .” What has been the 
right thing to do all along was to solve the 
question in the Parliament within the EU 
democratization process, without involving 
the discussion of whether the terror would 
cease or not. If this would have been done, 
Ocalan would have been disadvantaged to a 
certain extent. However, when the present 
picture is one of “granting the rights in 
parallel to terror ending”, it ended up 
signaling that Ocalan will get those rights by 
force, which in turn caused a negative public 
response. As a result, we have a dangerous 
divergence instead of national unity. If the 
Prime Minister is going back anywhere, he 
should be going back the EU roadmap and 
do what’s necessary without engaging in 
any negotiations. 
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